Specifically, I address brain in a vat cases, socially justified beliefs/affirmation,and skeptical worries about the correct procedure of judgment. Finally, I sketch out potential responses to objections that epistemic secure realism might face concerning justification. To help develop this position, I weave together conceptual materials from Ernest Sosa and William James having to do with judgment and conscious volition. In response, I set out epistemic secure realism as an intuitive way to avoid the paradoxes that I developed against foundationalism and coherentism while still maintaining the phenomenologically plausible notion of judgment.
While there are somewhat unusual situations where. Both views, I argue, violate indubitable phenomenological theses and thus will have to be discarded. Knowledge of a statement exists when the statement is true, it is believed, and it is justified. Against the coherentist, I make a similar rule-following argument using a new brain in a vat scenario I call ‘nonsense in a vat’, in which our existing epistemic practices turn out to seem coherent but instead are nonsensical. Against the foundationalist, I marshal a Wittgeinsteinian-style private language argument. I argue against two of these positions: common kind foundationalism and common kind coherentism. This thesis constrains the possible ways justification can be plausibly structured. I do this through a transcendental argument against a thesis whose truth would preclude epistemic secure realism: the ‘common kind justification thesis’, the view that indistinguishable epistemic states must have the same epistemic status.
I argue for epistemic secure realism, the view that a successful conscious act to form the knowledge that p, where p is a worldly proposition, involves coming into secure cognitive contact with the fact that p by exercising our capacity for rational (worldly) thought.
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